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After decades of growth and popularity, the international
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime has come under intense
criticism recently-particularly concerning the perceived chilling effect
the regime imposes on states' ability to regulate in the public interest.
This Article seeks to contextualize this criticism by examining the
historical antecedent of ISDS in international law: the law of diplomatic
protection. It proceeds to focus on the flexibility of ISDS as a critical
advance over diplomatic protection, and shows how ISDS has evolved
over time-particularly as developed states have moved from
approaching the regime from a predominantly investment-exporting
perspective to a more balanced perspective that accounts for inbound
foreign investments. In concrete terms, the inherent flexibility of ISDS
has permitted it increasingly to protect states' interests in regulating in
the public interest, while at the same time protecting foreign investment
against inappropriate governmental interference. The Article ultimately
argues that the ISDS system should be permitted to continue to evolve to
arrive at the appropriate equilibrium for its time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime' has come
under severe criticism in recent years, especially in terms of the
perceived limits it places on states' abilities to regulate in the public
interest.2 Concerns about the system have encouraged states to reduce
their participation in it or to withdraw from it altogether.
3
This Article explores the current dissatisfaction with ISDS and
reactions to this dissatisfaction through the lens of the historical
antecedent of ISDS: the law of diplomatic protection. While both are
mechanisms that enable investors to obtain redress for internationally
wrongful acts, ISDS is nimble and flexible in comparison to the law of
diplomatic protection. ISDS agreements are negotiated between states,
mostly on a bilateral basis, and this gives the state-parties the ability
and flexibility to craft agreements that can, and do, changed over time
to meet new imperatives. The pace of change in recent years,
culminating for purposes of this Article in the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement,4 has been dramatic and represents a reclaiming
power on the part of states to regulate in the public interest with
minimized fears of large claims brought by investors. Whether this
1. While ISDS includes investment treaty arbitration, investor-state dispute
resolution provisions in investment contracts, and such provisions in domestic investment
laws, the focus of this Article concerns ISDS as expressed in investment treaty arbitration.
See generally EUR. COMMISSION, INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS): SOME
FACTS AND FIGURES 3-4 (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc-
153046.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8W8-4VXUI.
2. See, e.g., Cecilia Malmstr6m, Investments in TTIP and Beyond - Towards an
International Investment Court, EUR. COMMISSION (May 5, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/investments-ttip-and-beyond-
towards-international-investment-court-en [https://perma.cc/V7MM-AXHS] ("So, the basic
idea behind these agreements is sound. However, these agreements have come under
increasing criticism. ... My assessment of the traditional ISDS system has been clear - it is
not fit for purpose in the 21st century. I want the rule of law, not the rule of lawyers. I want
to ensure fair treatment for EU investors abroad, but not at the expense of governments'
right to regulate.").
3. See Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties over Time - Treaty
Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World 6-7 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.
(OECD) Working Papers on Int'l Inv., No. 2015/02, 2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7rhd8sq7h-en [https://perma.cc/5ER3-WZF6].
4. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S. [hereinafter
USMCA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-
canada-agreement/united-states-mexico [https://perma.cc/Q937-TQQM] (last visited Oct. 27,
2018) (not yet entered into force).
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represents a high-water mark, or simply anticipates further steps in
this direction, remains to be seen, but what is certain is that the
inherent flexibility of ISDS will ensure that it will change as the
demands of the market change.
Part II of this Article discusses what ISDS is, giving some
historical context for the regime's building blocks-that is, investment
treaties. It proceeds to discuss the role and shortcomings of the
antecedent of ISDS that prompted the rise of ISDS in the first place.
Part III discusses the basic drivers of investment treaty arbitration,
including the question of what motivates states to enter into these
international commitments, and, importantly, how and why these
motivations change over time. By reference to the US Model BIT
program, this Article will show how, as the motivations of states
change, ISDS changes. The Article concludes with Part IV, and by
reference to the latest treaties, shows that the flexibility of ISDS is
evolving towards treaties that distinctly favor increasing states'
abilities to legislate in the public interest, including in relation to issues
of human rights. Indeed, the latest iteration-the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement-indicates continued dramatic change that
may either upend the system or ensure its long-term viability.
II. WHAT Is ISDS AND WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
The very name-investor-state dispute settlement-indicates
the direct settlement of disputes between investors and the foreign
states in which they invest. Settlements between states and investors
can occur through arbitration or some other form of dispute resolution.5
ISDS has become so much a part of the international legal
landscape in recent decades that it is easy to forget that its original
purpose was to provide a better and more efficient alternative to a pre-
existing international law regime: the law of diplomatic protection.6
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 1, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]. Other methods of dispute resolution are conciliation, "early neutral
evaluation, facilitated negotiation and/or mediation." See Other Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES (ICSID),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Other-ADR-Mechanisms.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S74C-KY9X] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
6. See Arseni Matveev, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Evolving Balance
Between Investor Protection and State Sovereignty, 40 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 348, 356 (2015).
The law of diplomatic protection dates back to 1758, when the Swiss jurist Emmerich Vattel
wrote that "[w]hoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that
citizen." Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (Charles G.
Fenwick trans., 1758), in 4(3) THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (James Brown
2018] 419
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
The law of diplomatic protection worked well enough in the context of
investment disputes to have dominated the legal landscape from the
late nineteenth century well into the latter part of the twentieth
century.7
The diplomatic protection regime was very much a product of its
time, when the prevailing view of international law was that it
regulated relations between states themselves, not between citizens
and states. For example, under the law of diplomatic protection, if a
US citizen invested in France, and France took steps against that
investor or its investment hat amounted to an internationally wrongful
act" and refused to make reparations, that US citizen would have
needed to complain to the US government. In turn, if the US
government was motivated to do so, it would espouse its citizen's claim
and approach France on a state-to-state basis to seek reparations for
the internationally wrongful act.9
Scott ed., 1912); see also John Dugard, Articles on Diplomatic Protection, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR.
INT'L L. (2006), http://1egal.un.org/avl/haladp/adp.html [https://perma.cc/CEC9-5SZL].
7. See Dugard, supra note 6 ("The principle that a State was entitled to protect a
national injured abroad became a central feature of relations between Western European
States and the United States on the one hand and Latin American States on the other during
the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century....
After World War II two developments had an impact on the law of diplomatic protection.
First, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, 1965, and a myriad of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
facilitate the protection of foreign investment. . . . Secondly, the advent of the human rights
treaty has seen the conferral of rights on individuals which may be asserted not only against
an individual's own State but also against other States, without the intervention of the
individual's national State. Many have argued that this makes diplomatic protection
redundant. Diplomatic protection is therefore today not the only instrument of international
law that may be used by an individual whose personal or property rights have been
unlawfully violated abroad by a foreign government. BITs provide protection for the
investments of foreigners and human rights treaties offer remedies for the violation of
personal human rights. But diplomatic protection remains a mechanism of international law
that is still employed by States to secure just treatment for their nationals abroad. Moreover
it has largely lost its reputation as a procedure used by rich, developed nations to interfere
in the domestic affairs of developing nations. This is evidenced by the manner in which
developing nations have not hesitated to invoke international law's oldest mechanism for the
protection of aliens abroad.").
8. "There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of
an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b)
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State." Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of
the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 26 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Report]
(presenting Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).
9. For example, in the Maurommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent
Court of International Justice declared in 1924 that "[b]y taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law." Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions
(Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30).
[Vol. 21:2:417420
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From the investor's perspective, this was not a very satisfactory
process for a number of reasons. First, claimants in such a setting are
obliged to exhaust local remedies, or to demonstrate that exhaustion
would be futile (often a costly and time-consuming process) before their
claims could be espoused.10 Second, once the state decides to espouse
the claim, it becomes the state's claim as a matter of international law,
and thus the investor-claimant loses control of its claim." Third, if
successful in its negotiations, the United States-in the above
example-is not obliged under international law to convey any
compensation it receives to the citizen investor.12  Usually, the
protecting state would at least keep a portion of any compensation paid
as an administrative fee for its efforts.13
Finally, worst of all for investors, the process takes a significant
amount of time. In addition to the time spent satisfying the exhaustion
requirement, the process of then determining whether a particular
claim was eligible for espousal is itself a multi-year process, involving
gathering the facts of the case, interviewing claimants, and conducting
legal research to determine whether the foreign state has committed
internationally wrongful acts in relation to the investment.14 Once the
state espouses the claim, it necessarily controls whether and when to
pursue the claim, considering its relations with the foreign government.
In cases that involve postwar and postconflict settlements, negotiations
10. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 671(g)-(h) (2012)
("As with private commercial disputes, however, a United States citizen/national engaged in
an investment dispute with a host government bears the primary responsibility for pursuing
its resolution. Before the USG takes a position on the merits of the investor's dispute with
the host government, normally the investor must pursue all available local remedies on its
behalf.").
11. Maximilian Koessler, Government Espousal of Private Claims Before
International Tribunals, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 180, 182 (1946) ("It has been generally accepted
that the moment a state has officially declared that it will 'espouse' the claim or assume
'diplomatic protection' of its national, the 'pro foro externo' control of the claim belongs
exclusively to the protecting government. This means two things: first, that in so far as the
procedure is concerned, the government is the sole and independent party-plaintiff, so that
any procedural step or declaration can be made only by the government; second, that in so
far as the defendant or opponent state is concerned any substantive disposition of the claim,
including discharge or compromise, may be made only by the protecting state, with binding
effect upon the interested private person, irrespective of his assent or protest.").
12. See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10, at 21 (2006) (presenting Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection)
("Recommended Practice: A State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection according to the
present draft articles, should: . . . (c) [t]ransfer to the injured person any compensation
obtained for the injury from the responsible State subject to any reasonable deductions."
(emphasis added)).
13. Id.
14. For a description of this process, see Gordon A. Christenson, International
Claims Procedure Before the Department of State, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 528, 534 (1962).
2018] 421
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are typically only possible after the normalization of relations between
the states concerned; the process of normalization itself can take
decades.15
It is worth noting that long before the ascendancy of ISDS, the
pros and cons of diplomatic protection over an ISDS-like system were
hotly debated in the US Congress. One of the arguments raised in 1949
against establishing the International Claims Commission as a
permanent claims body was based on part of the post-World War II
Marshall Plan-the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (ECA). 16 Under
a provision of the ECA, states that received US aid were required to
pledge to arbitrate any disputes relating to US citizens' investments in
those states.1 7 On the basis of this provision, Congressman John Martin
Vorys argued, presciently, as follows:
There is general agreement as to the importance of encouraging private investment
in foreign lands as a postwar policy. In the ECA law steps were taken towards
encouraging such investment by requiring protection of United States investors. In
section 115b(10) each participating country must agree to submit for the decision of
an international tribunal mutually agreed upon case-"involving compensation of a
national of the United States for governmental measures affecting his property
rights, including contracts with or concessions from such country." This bill heads
in the opposite direction; instead of our Government's insisting upon impartial
arbitration of claims for seizure and nationalization of American property, our
Government is to make a practice of wholesale diplomatic "settlements" of such
claims, with the proceeds to be parceled out to American claimants by a State
Department agency without giving the claimant a chance to be heard in court either
in the foreign country or here at home. This may encourage nationalization in
foreign countries; it will certainly not encourage American investment abroad.
18
15. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N OF THE
U.S., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/page/file/984371/
download [https://perma.cc/7SD4-4W7U] ("As part of the process toward normalization of
diplomatic relations, the United States and Libyan Governments concluded an agreement
on August 14, 2008, that included a provision for the settlement of U.S. nationals' claims
against Libya arising out of certain terrorist incidents occurring prior to June 30, 2006. The
Agreement provided for a lump-sum payment of $1.5 billion in settlement of all claims of
U.S. nationals arising out of these incidents." (citation omitted)). The claims settled in the
agreement between the United States and Libya included claims from two decades earlier
resulting from the April 1986 bombing of the LaBelle disco in Berlin. See id. at 19-20.
16. See generally Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (Marshall Plan), Pub. L. No. 80-
472, 62 Stat. 137 (1948).
17. Id. § 115(b). Countries participating in the bilateral agreements had to agree to
submit "for the decision of the International Court of Justice or of any arbitral tribunal
mutually agreed upon any case espoused by the United States Government involving
compensation of a national of the United States for governmental measures affecting his
property rights, including contracts with or concessions from such country." § 115(b)(10).
18. FOREIGN AFFAIRS LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 157 (John Norton
Moore ed., 2013) (citing Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (ECA): Hearing on H.R. 4406, 81st
Cong., part 2, at 3 (June 30, 1949) (statement of the minority view by Congressman Vorys)).
[Vol. 21:2:417422
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Congressman Vorys' statement succinctly lays out some of the
frustrations with the system of diplomatic protection-specifically in
terms of its ability to protect foreign investment and to provide effective
redress in the event of illegal actions on the part of the host state. At
the same time, he highlights the benefits of an alternative system that
permits the investors themselves to bring direct claims against the
offending government in a neutral, international forum. Congressman
Vorys was ahead of his time in seeking a mechanism that would permit
investors to make direct claims against foreign governments;
notwithstanding his argument, the International Claims Commission,
a vehicle of US diplomatic protection, was established by Congress in
1949.19
The derivation of ISDS from the diplomatic protection
framework is also indicated by article 27(1) of the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, which
provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection,
or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one, of its
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit
or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention . . . ."20
Thus, ISDS was intended to replace diplomatic protection in the foreign
investment arena and, in doing so, was designed to avoid the problems
inherent in diplomatic protection.21 Moreover, ISDS had an added goal
of "depoliticiz[ing]" these kinds of disputes between states.22 The key
aspect of ISDS is that it permits-by the consent of the state-parties to
19. See Zvonko R. Rode, The International Claims Commission of the United States:
August 28, 1950-June 30, 1953, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 615, 618-19 (1953). Under Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1954, the War Claims Commission and the International Claims Commission
were abolished, and their functions transferred to the US Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC). See About the Commission, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (July 10, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/fesc/about-commission [https://perma.cc/7Y9H-WYWP]. The
commission continues to serve a vital function in relation to the satisfaction of large-scale
claims made by US citizens against foreign governments, most recently in connection with
the claims of US victims of international terrorism and mass claims. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 2. Interestingly, the United Kingdom counterpart to the FCSC-
the "Foreign Compensation Commission" -was "[wound] up" on the grounds that it was "last
active in the administration of a claims programme in 1994." See Foreign Compensation
Commission (Winding Up) Order 2013, 2013 No. 236, Explanatory Memorandum ¶ 7.2
(Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksil2013/236/pdfs/uksiem_20130236_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35YC-TWVM] ("Its continuing cost, as considered against its long-standing
inactivity and the perceived unlikelihood of it being required in the future, indicate that its
sustained existence cannot be justified.").
20. ICSID Convention, supra note 5, art. 27(1).
21. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 415-
17 (2d ed. 2009).
22. Id. at 416.
2018] 423
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agreementS23-private parties (i.e., investors) to bring claims directly
against a sovereign state for prescribed kinds of wrongs.24 The issues
no longer are "irritants" between states, but are treated as legal
disputes to be resolved through an independent law-based
mechanism.25
The workhorse of the ISDS system is investment treaty
arbitration; the treaties between states that define and describe the
reciprocal rights and obligations of the state-parties vis-a-vis each other
and their investors. These treaties come in a variety of forms, including
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between two stateS2
6 and
multilateral investment treaties (MITs) between more than two states,
including multilateral trade agreements with investment chapters-
like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 2 7 According
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), there are well over 2,600 of these treaties in force today
across the globe.28
Two key attributes differentiate investor-state treaties from
their progenitors. First, and most importantly, they are individually
negotiated between the contracting parties, whether two or more. In
other words, they are bespoke agreements. This attribute is an
important departure from the law of diplomatic protection, which draws
on the full range of "customary and conventional international law,"
2 9
insofar as it permits the contracting parties to describe and define the
protections they mutually agree to accord to each other's investors. It
also permits the parties to terminate the agreements as per their
terms,30 and, naturally, as with any contract, to renegotiate the terms
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY,
AND INTERPRETATION 427-37 (2010).
26. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Afg.-Ger., Apr. 20, 2005, 2554 U.N.T.S. 119.
27. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
28. See International Investment Agreements Navigator, U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV.:
INv. POL'Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/JR42-ZDXB]
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
29. See ILC Report, supra note 8, at 31.
30. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 2205 ("A party may withdraw from this
Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties. If
a Party withdraws, the Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining Parties."). For an
example of the termination provisions in BITs, see the agreement between the Kingdom of
Spain and the Republic of Albania. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection




at any time.31 The advent of investment agreements thus not only
replaced the law of diplomatic protection, it ushered in an era where
the particular rules were specified and agreed to by the contracting
parties and could be adjusted as necessary by those contracting parties
to achieve the appropriate balance sought. Second, the commitments
contained in the agreements are reciprocal: they apply equally to both
parties. As discussed below, the reciprocal nature of the commitments
has a disciplining effect on both parties over time, as their economies
and experiences evolve. In other words, states understand better with
experience that what was once viewed as a positive, investor-friendly
provision today can just as easily be seen as a regulatory-hampering
provision tomorrow.
Thus, the fundamental nature of BITs and MITs as reciprocal
agreements permits adjustments that have the goal of striking the right
balance between investor rights and government regulations. In other
words, the system itself is able to make adjustments to meet the
criticisms it faces, and as will be shown in the Sections that follow, has
made significant progress in this regard.
III. THE BASIC DYNAMICS OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
Historically, two basic and complementary motivations prompt
states to enter into these investment agreements.32 On the one hand,
states seek to encourage their citizens to invest in foreign countries and
to promote these agreements that protect the ability of theses citizens
to make those investments without governmental interference.33 On
the other hand, some states want to attract investment and
demonstrate a safe environment for foreign investments by entering
into BITs that require them to adhere to certain agreed standards of
9JHE] ("[T]his Agreement may be denounced at any time by either Party giving twelve
month's written notice to the other Party.").
31. See, e.g., Kevin Liptak, Jeremy Diamond & Katie Lobosco, US and Mexico Reach
a Preliminary Trade Deal That Could Replace NAFTA, CNN (Aug. 27, 2018, 5:05 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/27/politics/mexico-us-trade-deallindex.html
[https://perma.cc/ML8S-BEMJ] (detailing the recent renegotiation of the NAFTA treaty).
The NAFTA parties have renegotiated the agreement as of the writing of this Article, while
the existing agreement remains in full effect. See USMCA, supra note 4.
32. RODERIK ABBOTT, FREDERIK ERIXON & MARTINA FRANCESCA FERRACANE,
EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT'L POLITICAL ECON., DEMYSTIFYING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (ISDS) 6 (2014), http://ecipe.org//app/uploads/2014/12/OCC52014_l.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZKP4-Y6V2].
33. Id. at 6; see also SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43052, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4
(2013) ("In the beginning, BITs were drafted by capital-exporting states with the primary
purpose of protecting their investors from unfair foreign treatment.").
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treatment. Simply put, the main focus of states entering into these
agreements is to attract investment-oftentimes with little
appreciation of the potential ramifications of the commitments they are
entering into.34 Moreover, these investment-seeking states-usually
those with less-developed economies than investment-exporting
stateS35-historically have not had much leverage in negotiating BITs,
and have often simply accepted the arguably offensively minded BITs
offered by the investment-exporting state.36
This has been a basic dynamic of the system; however, this
dynamic is not set in stone. Many states, like the United States, started
out as investment exporters-with an outward-looking, or "offensive,"
approach to negotiating BITs.3 7 However, the distinction between
investment-exporting states and investment-seeking states has become
less sharp over the past few decades, forcing states to reconsider their
positions in terms of these treaties.38 The United States provides an
example of how the flexibility of the ISDS system can, and has, evolved
34. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 3, at 10 ("[C]ountries that, at one time and for various
reasons, had not given in-depth consideration to investment treaties' language prior to
adoption - or that realised only later how the language in the treaty was understood by
tribunals - may now feel a need to adjust treaty practice .... ).
35. ABBOT, ERIXON & FERRACANE, supra note 32, at 5 (stating that the first BIT was
concluded between Germany, a developed economy, and Pakistan, a developing economy, in
1959); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the
United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 209 (1988) ("Unlike the modern FCNs, which were
directed primarily at developed countries, the [US] BITs were targeted at developing
countries."). Of the forty-seven BITs entered into by the United States, only five are with
developed countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). See United
States ofAmerica: Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV.: INV. POL'Y. HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/223#iialnnerMenu
[https://perma.cc/3S9M-DBUK] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018); see also World Economic and
Financial Surveys, INT'L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/
01/weodata/groups.htm [https://perma.cc/HMF6-V67Z] (listing the criteria for, and names of,
developed countries) (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
36. Jason Webb Yackee, Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement?
Or, Toward Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 277, 290-91 (2013) ("Most capital exporting states develop model
investment treaties that serve as the beginning, and perhaps more or less the end, of most
BIT negotiations.").
37. See Vandevelde, supra note 35, at 209-10 ('"The BITS had three purposes: (1) to
provide greater protection for United States investment in those countries with which the
United States negotiated BITs, (2) to reaffirm that the protection of United States foreign
investment remained an important element of United States foreign policy, and (3) to
establish a body of practice to support the United States view of international law governing
the protection of foreign investment.").
38. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 3, at 9 ("As the distinction between capital-exporting
and capital-importing countries continues to fade many countries now are 'a bit of both'-
countries' perceived self-interests in relation to investment treaties may have evolved.").
[Vol. 21:2:417426
ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
towards a more balanced regime-particularly into areas that preserve
the states' abilities to regulate in the public interest.39
Since 1977, the United States has based its BIT program on the
development and publication of a "model" BIT, which formed the basis
for its negotiations with other countries.40 As noted above, the basic
purposes of this program were offensive; that is, to provide greater
protections for US investors investing overseas, to reinforce that the
protections the United States sought were an important part of its
foreign policy, and to establish a body of practice to support the US view
of investment protection in international law.4 1 The United States
completed its first model text in 1981, the text of which drew from
European BITs made with developing countries that had been in place
since the very late 1950s.4 2 The United States' first agreement, based
on its 1981 model, was negotiated and signed in 1982 with Panama.43
The US models continued to evolve; moreover, there were
several modest revisions of the US Model BIT in the 1980s that
culminated in the 1984 model.44  During that time, the main
substantive investor protections contained in the US Model BIT were
extensive, while the "carve-outs" that permitted government action
were few. Thus, the 1984 model included, among other things, the
following investment-friendly provisions:
39. A shift from being an investment exporter to an investment importer is not the
only driver of a state's motivation to adjust its ISDS policy positions. Id. Other motivations
are readily apparent: the shock of a BIT claim-especially the first such claim--often
prompts, on the part of the targeted State, a review of the commitments in BITs and follow-
on adjustments. Id. at 10. Relatedly, gaining the legal capacity-especially on the part of
developing states-and experience necessary to fully appreciate the implications of
commitments made in BITs can prompt an overall review of treaty practice. Id. at 9.
Nonetheless, the US experience in adjusting its ISDS positions in anticipation of increased
inbound investment highlights the critical flexibility of the ISDS system as a whole. See
generally id. (discussing the reasons why states reconsider ISDS positions).
40. See Vandevelde, supra note 35, at 209-10.
41. See id.
42. MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33978, THE U.S. BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW, at summary, 6 (2007).
43. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, Pan.-U.S., Oct.
27, 1982, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-14 (1986); see also Vandevelde, supra note 35, at 210.
44. Vandevelde, supra note 35, at 210-11 ("Developing a model text was also a
continuous process. Experience in the early rounds of negotiations, primarily with Egypt and
Panama, suggested the need for improvements in the December 1981 model text. The United
States negotiating team produced a series of revised models through 1982, resulting in a
model dated January 21, 1983 ('the 1983 draft').... Experience with the 1983 draft revealed
the need for further improvements, particularly to simplify some of its wordier passages.
Accordingly, the United States negotiators developed a streamlined model dated February
24, 1984 ('the 1984 draft').").
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* A guarantee to the investor of the better of national treatment
or most favored nation treatment for the full life cycle of
investment.45 This means the foreign investor is entitled to be
treated as favorably as the host party treats its own investors
and their investments, or investors and investments from any
third country, whichever is most favorable;
* A treaty-based commitment to accord "fair and equitable"
treatment to investors and their investments. In other words,
treatment greater than that afforded under customary
international law;46
* An "umbrella clause" that requires each state to observe any
obligation it has assumed with respect to investors of other
states: "Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have
entered into with regard to investments."47 This is designed to
be a catch-all provision that can, for example, convert what
was up to this point a contract claim into a BIT claim;48
* Provisions on the expropriation of investments that require
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation when an
expropriation takes place;49
* The right to submit an investment dispute with the treaty
partner's government to international arbitration.5 0
There was only one significant carve-out that would permit the
state-parties to act against the interests of foreign investors without the
risk of triggering liability under the BIT: the "essential security
45. Text of the U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment of February 24, 1984, 4 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 136, 137 art. 1(1)
(1986) [hereinafter Text of 1984 Model Treaty].
46. Id. at 137-38 art. 11(2). Investor-State tribunals have recognized that treaty-
based (or "autonomous") standards for "fair and equitable treatment" are not limited by
customary international law. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, TT 607-
08, 611 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Tri. June 8, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0378.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9AD-8HZK] ("Ascertaining custom is
necessarily a factual inquiry, looking to the actions of States and the motives for and
consistency of these actions. By applying an autonomous standard, on the other hand, a
tribunal may focus solely on the language and nuances of the treaty language itself and,
applying the rules of treaty interpretation, require no party proof of State action or opinio
juris.")
47. Text of 1984 Model Treaty, supra note 45, at 137-38 art. 11(2).
48. See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches
of Contract, Treaty Violations, and Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in
Foreign Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 137, 139, 147 (2006).
49. Text of 1984 Model Treaty, supra note 45, at 138-39 art. III(1).
50. Id. at 140-41 art. VI.
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exception."51 The essential security exception permitted the United
States and its BIT partners to take measures necessary for the
fulfillment of their national obligations with respect to the protection of
their own essential security interests.52
Considering the investment protections and the relatively
narrow carve-out, these early model US BITs were clearly designed
with the United States' offensive, investment-exporting goals in mind.
The first major shift in the other direction for the United States
occurred when it was considering an agreement that included other
sophisticated economies: the NAFTA. The agreement was negotiated
for several years, and came into law in the United States in December
1993.53 Chapter 11 of NAFTA contains the ISDS provisions, and
subsequent experience with the agreement included an increasing
realization of the potential for claims against the United States:
In the decade since the NAFTA's passage, concerns emerged in both Canada and the
United States about the extent of investor coverage, especially in cases of indirect
expropriation, or government regulation that under the Agreement might be subject
to dispute settlement. Unlike other U.S. BITs, where the United States is the
primary foreign investor, NAFTA guaranteed investor protection between two
developed countries (Canada and the United States), with significant amounts of
cross-border investment.5 4
Following from the NAFTA experience, the US Model BIT
program sought to better balance the need to protect investors abroad,
but also to protect the government's ability to regulate.55 Model BITs
were published in 1994, 2004, and 2012-each one more progressive in
this regard.56
51. Id. at 142 art. X ("This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party
of measures necessary in its jurisdiction for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.").
52. See id.
53. See WEISS, supra note 42, at 12; North American Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-
american-free-trade-agreement-nafta [https://perma.cc/KJC5-SCK8] (last visited Oct. 10,
2018); David Alire & Michael O'Boyle, The Rocky History of NAFTA, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2017,
12:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-timeline/the-rocky-history-of-
nafta-idUSKCN1BC5IL [https://perma.cc/D5K9-8TUE].
54. See WEISS, supra note 42, at 12.
55. See id. ("[R]esponding to U.S. concerns that the types of protection granted to
foreign investors by NAFTA may have been written too broadly, and that foreign investors
may receive more favorable treatment for their NAFTA investor-state dispute claims than
Americans would under U.S. law, Congress directed the Executive Branch in the Trade Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-126) to revise various provisions in its investments agreement negotiations
to reach a better balance allowing U.S. sovereignty to legislate in its national interest.").
56. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 U.S. MODEL
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2012) [hereinafter 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT]; see also Kenneth
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A comparison of the investment protections and carve-outs in
the 1984 Model BIT and the 2012 Model BIT5 7 neatly tells the story.
The 2012 Model BIT includes the following major protections:
* National and most favored nation treatment (similar to
1984);58
* Fair and equitable treatment tied to the customary
international law standard59-more restrictive than the free
standing, or "autonomous," standard set forth in the 1984
Model;60 clear limits on the expropriation of investments and,
in particular, for indirect expropriation involving government
actions.61 Annex B to the 2012 Model sets forth factors that
are to be considered by an investment tribunal when
determining whether there has been an indirect
expropriation.62 The 2012 Model sets forth detailed standards
on compensation63 and exempts compulsory licenses granted
in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement.64
Aside from this tightening of the main protections that are a
standard part of BITs, the 2012 Model BIT does not include other
protections that existed in the 1984 Model-there is no requirement on
the part of the host state to provide an effective means of asserting
claims, and no "umbrella" clause.65
Of more significance to the issue of ensuring greater regulatory
space for governments are the carve-outs. The 2012 Model includes an
"essential security exception" that is now self-judging, and therefore not
subject to the interpretation of an arbitral tribunal: "Nothing in this
J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor
and Host Country Interests, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
2008/2009, 283 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
57. Compare 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 56, with Text of 1984 Model Treaty,
supra note 45.
58. Compare 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 56, arts. 3, 4, with Text of 1984 Model
Treaty, supra note 45, at 137 art. 11(1).
59. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 56, art. 5(1).
60. Text of 1984 Model Treaty, supra note 45, at 137-38 art. 11(2).
61. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 56, art. 6.
62. Id. annex B.
63. Id. art. 6.
64. Id. art. 6(5). "TRIPS" is the international agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips_e/
trips-e.htm [https://perma.cc/8BYC-62N5] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
65. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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Treaty shall be construed . . . to preclude a Party from applying
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to . . . the protection of its own essential security
interests."66
The 2012 Model also includes what is known as a "prudential
exception" with regard to financial services. As set forth in the 2012
Model, this provides that "a Party shall not be prevented from adopting
or maintaining measures relating to financial services for prudential
reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy
holders . . . or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial
system."67
Relatedly, the 2012 Model provides further regulatory space in
the form of the monetary policy exception, which provides that
"[n]othing in this Treaty applies to non-discriminatory measures of
general application taken by any public entity in pursuit of monetary
and related credit policies or exchange rate policies."68
The 2012 US Model also has exceptions for government
procurement69 and taxation,70 and has extensive provisions designed to
ensure that the system is transparent and accountable.71 The model
adds provisions on investment and the environment that give the
government discretion to act notwithstanding the other commitments.72
For example, article 12.3 of the Model BIT provides that "[t]he Parties
recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with
respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial
matters, and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to
... other environmental matters determined to have higher
priorities."73
Finally, there are extensive provisions in article 13 that address
investment and labor.74 Fundamentally, these seek to ensure that the
state-parties do not take measures that weaken or reduce the
protections under domestic labor laws and their commitments under
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on
66. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 56, art. 18 (emphasis added).
67. Id. art. 20(1).
68. Id. art. 20(2). To ensure that any tribunal seized of a claim concerning articles
20.1 and 20.2 will stay within the intended confines of these articles, article 20.3 sets forth
separate requirements for dispute resolution. See id. art. 20(3).
69. Id. art. 14(5).
70. Id. art. 21.
71. Id. art. 11.
72. Id. art. 12.
73. Id. art. 12(3).
74. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 56, art. 13.
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Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.75 These provisions of the
2012 US Model BIT affirm, in the context of these investment treaties,
the importance of basic human rights initiatives-including the
abolition of child and all forced labor, discrimination, and acceptable
work conditions.76
Seen in this historical light, the evolution of the US BIT program
has been dramatic in terms of the regulatory space it now accords to the
state-parties as compared to 1984, including in the area of human
rights. This evolution will continue; indeed, as discussed in the Section
that follows, initiatives of the European Union, and developing
countries themselves, go significantly further than the United States in
this regard, and it will only be a matter of time before we see a new US
model BIT.
IV. THE ISDS LANDSCAPE CONTINUES TO EVOLVE IN FAVOR OF
GREATER ROOM FOR STATES TO LEGISLATE AND REGULATE IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
Other forces continue to shape the ISDS landscape. These
include increased unilateralism, which is reflected in the US
negotiating position in the current NAFTA 2.0 negotiations.77 This is
the greatest danger that the ISDS system faces. Other forces include
numerous dissatisfactions with the system, such as-for example-lack
of accountability of the arbitrators. As noted earlier, the shock of huge
awards against states cannot be overestimated; for example, Canada78
and Europe have been greatly impacted by these awards. For example,
a widely reported award against the Czech Republic roughly amounted
to the republic's entire annual public health budget.79 In many cases,
75. See id. art. 13.
76. See Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work (June 1988), https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang-
en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/WF9X-VANT].
77. See Mireya Solis, America First'Is a Losing Strategy on Trade, BROOKINGS (Oct.
24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edulblog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/24/america-first-is-a-
losing-strategy-on-trade! [https://perma.cc/2TPR-XELS].
78. See WEISS, supra note 42, at 12 ("Several major cases have been brought before
the NAFTA tribunals, some of which have led to monetary damage awards against Canada
and Mexico."); Nikesh Patel, Note, An Emerging Trend in International Trade: A Shift to
Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and Protect Host-State Sovereignty, 26 MINN. J. INT'L L. 273,
291 ("Canada is the most sued country under NAFTA. . . .").
79. See CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech), UNCITRAL,
Final Award, at 161 (Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 264 (2006); Peter S. Green, Czech Republic
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developing countries are increasingly rejecting the "common wisdom"
that BITs are necessary to attract foreign direct investment.80
In the face of all of this criticism, further aggressive evolution of
ISDS-which is designed, among other things, to increase the ability of
states to regulate in the public interest-has emerged. On September
21, 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between the European Union and Canada came into force
provisionally.8 1 CETA lays down the gauntlet in the first provision of
its Section D, "Investment Protection," and article 8.9, "Investment and
Regulatory Measures":
1. For the purpose of this Chapter, the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within
their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of
public health, safety, the environment or public morals, social or consumer
protection or the promotion and protection of cultural diversity.
2. For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a
modification to its laws, in a manner which negatively affects and investment or
interferes with an investor's legitimate expectations, including its expectation of
profits, does not amount to a breach of an obligation under this Section.82
Indeed, CETA is replete with the phrase "for greater
certainty."83 The message here, to appointees of CETA Tribunals, is
that the contracting parties have specific instructions as to how its
provisions are to be interpreted, and an expectation that they will be so
interpreted. In other words, the will of the contracting parties, rather
than the preferences of arbitrators, must prevail. To reinforce this
requirement, CETA has revolutionized ISDS by providing for an
80. See Trishna Menon & Gladwin Issac, Developing Country Opposition to an
Investment Court: Could State-State Dispute Settlement Be an Alternative?, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Feb. 17, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/02/17/developing-
country-opposition-investment-court-state-state-dispute-settlement-alternative/?print=pf
[https://perma.cc/FPF7-93V8] ("In recent years, countries including Brazil, India and South
Africa have significantly rethought their approach to investment protection, leading to many
policy innovations. . . . Other states that are attempting to disengage from the bonds of
traditional BITs and the ISDS regime are .. . Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, South Africa and
Indonesia. The reason for this is that many countries concluded BITs without fully
understanding their implications. When Pakistan was first sued in 2001, based on a 1995
BIT with Switzerland, no one in the government could find the text and had to ask
Switzerland for a copy. . .. Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan and some other countries have
reportedly rejected the initiative to establish a multilateral investment court. This suggests
that some of the strongest opposition to the ICS is likely to come from developing
countries. . . .").
81. See EU-Canada Trade Agreement Enters into Force, EUR. COMMISSION (Sept. 20,
2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1723 [https://perma.cc/JTG4-
UMNV].
82. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), art. 8(9), Oct. 30, 2016,
2017 O.J. (L11) 23 [hereinafter CETA].
83. This phrase appears twenty-one times in the investment chapter. See id. ch. 8.
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"Appellate Tribunal" to review awards rendered under the ISDS
chapter (chapter 8).84
In the event that CETA's first-instance tribunals and the
Appellate Tribunal continue to interpret provisions in a way not
intended by the contracting parties, the Agreement provides for a
mechanism to review and correct the course. Thus, for example, in
article 8.10, CETA defines and describes in detail the content of the "fair
and equitable treatment" obligation.85 Article 8.10.3 then provides:
The Parties shall regularly, or upon request of a Party, review the content of the
obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. The Committee on Services and
Investment, established under Article 26.2.1(b) (Specialized committees), may
develop recommendations in this regard and submit them to the CETA Joint
Committee for decision.8 6
This kind of revision is both revolutionary, in terms of BIT
practice to date, but it is also entirely consistent with the flexibility
inherent in ISDS that permits states to review and revise their
agreements to reach a proper balance at any point in time.
An even more dramatic revision of ISDS can be found in the
recent revisions of NAFTA-the newly minted, but not yet signed,
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). 87 While the text
of the agreement warrants serious study, some initial conclusions may
be drawn. First, the USMCA includes an article on corporate social
responsibility, reaffirming the following:
[Tihe importance of each Party encouraging enterprises operating within its
territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their internal
policies those internationally recognized standards, guidelines, and principles of
corporate social responsibility that have been endorsed or are supported by that
Party, which may include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
These standards, guidelines, and principles may address areas such as labor,
environment, gender equality, human rights, indigenous and aboriginal peoples'
rights, and corruption.
88
While this is clearly not a "hard" obligation, it is a provision that cannot
be found in earlier US agreements, including the 2012 Model BIT.
However, the USMCA significantly curtails ISDS. With respect
to disputes between US and Mexican investors, ISDS is limited to the
following sectors: oil and gas activities; the supply of power generation
services to the public; the supply of telecommunications services to the
84. See id. art. 8.28.
85. See id. art. 8.10.
86. Id. art. 8.10(3).
87. The investment chapter of the revised NAFTA (the USMCA) is now chapter 14
of the USMCA (the investment chapter of the 1994 NAFTA was Chapter 11). See USMCA,
supra note 4, ch. 14.
88. Id. art. 14.17.
[Vol. 21:2:417434
ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
public; the supply of transportation services to the public; and the
ownership and management of infrastructure, such as roads, railways,
canals, or dams.89 It also limits the kinds of claims that may be brought.
For example, while article 14.6 lays out the parties' agreement o accord
to investors of the other party "treatment in accordance with customary
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security," annex 14-D article 3 precludes the possibility
of bringing a claim in arbitration for a violation of this protection.90
There is no provision for ISDS involving Canada. Thus, the
USMCA places ISDS on a precipice: Can it continue to evolve in a way
that preserves the ability of investors to bring direct claims against
foreign governments for violations of international law standards of
treatments of aliens? Or will we continue to see an erosion of the system
to the point that it fades into obscurity? Again, the fundamental
flexibility of the system is likely to ensure its continuing relevance and
use.91
In any event, the story will not be told without input from
developing countries. As noted above, ISDS has presented a uniquely
sensitive challenge to developing states with limited governing and
regulatory capacity. Developing states appear to be ready now to start
to define the kinds of agreements that best reflect their own legal
systems, cultures, and needs. For example, a signed but not-yet-in-
force BIT between Morocco and Nigeria from December 2016 illustrates
the extra measures developing states are including in BITs to maintain
the proper balance of government control.92 Like CETA-and even the
USMCA-the text of this BIT clearly establishes the parties' intent to
preserve the ability of the states to regulate in its article 23, "The Right
of States to Regulate."93 Article 15, "Investment, Labour and Human
Rights," includes reciprocal commitments by the contracting parties to
achieve "high levels" of labor and human rights protections, and to
ensure that domestic laws and regulations meet international
standards in regards to human and labor rights.94 While these
89. Id. annex 14-E(6).
90. Id. art. 3, annex 14-D.
91. As if to underline that flexibility, USMCA annex 14-E(6) provides that "the
Annex Parties may agree to modify or eliminate this Annex." Id. annex 14-E(6).
92. See Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, Dec. 3, 2016,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5409 [https://perma.cc/2DD5-
6CV7] (not yet entered into force) (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
93. See id. art. 23.
94. See id. art. 15.
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provisions are, as of now, largely aspirational and leave much to the
discretion of any future tribunals interpreting these provisions,
developing country to developing country BITs will be an important
area to watch for future ISDS development.95
In conclusion, the historical arc of ISDS demonstrates that the
system has evolved dramatically in favor of states' abilities to regulate
in the public interest and specifically in the area of human rights. If
ISDS is to persist and succeed, it is essential that this evolution
continues to address the continuing legitimate concerns of the users of
the system.
95. See AXEL BERGER, FED. MINISTRY FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 1, 25 (2015),
https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/giz2015-en-StudyDeveloping-countries-and the_
futureof the internationalinvestment regime.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XYY-P5PQ].
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